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I
T
O
W
I 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
    n addressing the nuclear and ballistic missile programs of the Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK/North Korea), the U.N. Security Coun-
cil has adopted ten resolutions imposing sanctions of increasing breadth 
since 2006.1 While they look comprehensive, the DPRK still is advancing its 
programs and procurement prohibited by the relevant U.N. resolutions, ac-
cording to the Panel of Experts established pursuant to the U.N. Security 
Council resolution 1874 (the 1874 Panel of Experts). The country is appar-
ently taking advantage of the insufficient implementation of the resolutions. 
There are constant discussions on the way to improve the U.N. Member 
States’ implementation of the obligation of the resolutions. However, the 
shortcomings of the language of the resolutions should also be examined, as 
they effect U.N. Member States’ implementations. Sometimes the elements 
of the sanctions are left to be determined by each Member States to leave 
room to be adapted to each State’s administrative and legal system. However, 
often, ambiguities and lack of definitions are the result of compromises in 
the U.N. Security Council. 
Implementation by the Member States is a key element of effective sanc-
tions, and international awareness of the sanctions affects the implementa-
tion. In case of the DPRK sanction, awareness of the issue itself among 
Member States looks high. Eight of the ten relevant resolutions require U.N. 
Member States to provide reports to the Security Council of the measures 
taken to implement its provisions.2 The number of reports submitted evi-
dences the general international recognition of the necessity of the sanction 
regimes. For example, as of February 3, 2020, 92 States have submitted re-
ports on the implementation of Resolution 23753 and 114 States have sub-
mitted reports on the implementation of Resolution 2270.4 Nonetheless, 
how States implement the sanctions varies considerably. 
                                                                                                                      
1. S.C. Res. 1718 (Oct. 14, 2006); S.C. Res. 1874 (Jun. 12, 2009); S.C. Res. 2087 (Jan. 
22, 2013); S.C. Res. 2094 (Mar. 7, 2013); S.C. Res. 2270 (Mar. 2, 2016); S.C. Res. 2321 (Nov. 
30, 2016); S.C. Res. 2356 (Jun. 2, 2017); S.C. Res. 2371 (Aug. 5, 2017); S.C. Res. 2375 (Sep. 
11, 2017), S.C. Res. 2397 (Dec. 22, 2017). 
2. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 1, ¶ 11; S.C. Res. 1874, supra note 1, ¶ 22; S.C. Res. 2270, 
supra note 1, ¶ 40; S.C. Res. 2371, supra note 1, ¶ 18; S.C. Res. 2375, supra note 1, ¶¶ 8, 17. 
3. S.C. Res. 2375, supra note 1. 
4. S.C. Res. 2270, supra note 1. See Implementation Reports, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL 1718 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE (DPRK), https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/ 
sanctions/1718/implementation-reports (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). When compared to the 
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The Security Council initially imposed sanctions through Resolution 
1718 in 2006.5 Subsequent resolutions adopted new methods to clarify what 
the sanction measures require and States’ obligations. To enhance sanctions 
compliance, the obligations of States must be clear. At present, it is difficult 
for Member States to obtain interpretative guidance of certain operative par-
agraphs, as these paragraphs resulted from negotiation. As such, States are 
unlikely to reach consensus on the precise requirements of these sanctions 
measures. Moreover, the Committee established by Security Council Reso-
lution 1718 (1718 Committee) to implement the sanctions, consists of the 
same members as the Security Council, which only replicates the already ex-
isting interpretive issues. 
This article provides examples of operative paragraphs within Security 
Council resolutions that lack determinative language and shows how smart 
language can improve implementation. Part II outlines the development of 
sanction measures imposed by relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions. 
Part III identifies deficiencies in the language and failures by the Security 
Council to provide sufficiently specific definitions, thereby hindering the ef-
fective implementation of sanctions. Part IV concludes. 
 
II. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION PRACTICE SINCE 2006 
 
The U.N. Charter vests the Security Council with the authority and respon-
sibility of maintaining and restoring international peace and security.6 In ex-
ercising this responsibility, the Security Council determines, first, that there 
is a “threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression,” and sec-
ond, where there is a threat, breach, or act of aggression, “decide(s) what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42” to restore or 
maintain international peace and security.7 The Security Council’s authority 
to impose economic sanctions flows from Article 41, which states: 
                                                                                                                      
submission of reports under U.N. Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on 
Yemen (twenty-nine State reports) and South Sudan (twenty-four State reports) the number 
of States complying is significantly greater. For Yemen, see Implementation Reports, UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 2140 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE (YEMEN), https://www.un. 
org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2140/implementation-reports (last visited Mar. 23, 2020); 
for South Sudan, see Implementation Reports, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL SOUTH 
SUDAN SANCTIONS COMMITTEE, https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/2206/ 
implementation-reports (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
5. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 1. 
6. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
7. Id. 
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The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may 
call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations 
and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of commu-
nication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.8 
 
The Security Council first imposed sanctions in 1966 and has since estab-
lished thirty sanctions regimes against a wide range of States, groups, and 
individuals, including apartheid South Africa, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, 
Libya, and Iran.9 On July 5, 2006, the DPRK launched seven ballistic mis-
siles.10 To condemn this act, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1695 
on July 15.11 However, this resolution does not impose sanctions under 
Chapter VII of Charter of the United Nations. Instead, the resolution urges 
the DPRK to “return immediately to the Six-Party Talks without precondi-
tion,” “to abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programmes,” 
and “to return at an early date to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons and International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards.”12 
To achieve these objectives, this resolution requires Member States to pre-
vent the procurement for this country’s missile development and the transfer 
of financial resources related to its missile or WMD programs.13 
On October 9, 2006, the DPRK conducted its first nuclear weapons 
test.14 The Security Council condemned this act and issued Resolution 1718, 
which determined that the increased tension created by the DPRK’s nuclear 
                                                                                                                      
8. Id. art. 41. 
9 . See generally Sanctions, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, https://www.un. 
org/securitycouncil/sanctions/information (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
10. Press Release, USNORTHCOM Public Affairs, USNORTHCOM Statement on 
DPRK Missile Launches (July 4, 2006), https://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/Article/ 
563300/usnorthcom-statement-on-dprk-missile-launches/; Press Release, USNORTH-
COM Public Affairs, U.S. Northern Command Confirms 7th Missile Launch by DPRK 
(July 5, 2006), https://www.northcom.mil/Newsroom/Article/563299/us-northern-com-
mand-confirms-7th-missile-launch-by-dprk/; see also Norimitsu Onishi & David E. Sanger, 
Missiles Fired by North Korea; Tests Protested, NEW YORK TIMES, July 5, 2006, https://www.ny-
times.com/2006/07/05/world/asia/05 missile.html. 
11. S.C. Res. 1695 (July 15, 2006). 
12. Id. ¶ 5. 
13. Id. ¶¶ 3–4. 
14. 9 October 2006 – First DPRK Nuclear Test, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN 
TREATY ORGANIZATION, https://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/9-october-2006-
first-dprk-nuclear-test (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
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weapons test constituted a “clear threat to international peace and secu-
rity.”15 Resolution 1718 imposed numerous sanctions, including a ban on the 
import of and export to the DPRK of major military equipment, such as 
tanks, armored vehicles, combat aircraft, and missiles.16 It also prohibited 
items, materials, equipment, goods, and technology that could contribute to 
the DPRK’s nuclear, missile, and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
programs.17 Further, it imposed a ban on the import of luxury goods by the 
DPRK and froze the assets of persons and entities involved in the nuclear 
program.18 Lastly, it established the 1718 Committee, a committee consisting 
of the members of the Security Council to monitor and oversee the sanctions 
program.19 
The next resolution, Resolution 1874,20 followed the DPRK’s second 
nuclear test conducted on May 25, 2009.21 This resolution expanded the arms 
embargo to include all arms, related materiel, and relevant services.22 It also 
established the 1874 Panel of Experts to assist the 1718 Committee in car-
rying out its mandate.23 By 2012, the 1718 Committee designated five indi-
viduals and eleven entities as engaging in or providing support for the coun-
try’s nuclear, ballistic missiles, or other WMD programs, and applied Reso-
lution 1718 to freeze these assets and impose travel bans.24 
The Security Council adopted Resolution 208725 on January 22, 2013, 
condemning the DPRK’s test launch using ballistic missile technology on 
                                                                                                                      
15. S.C. Res. 1718, supra note 1, pmbl. 
16. Id. ¶¶ 8(a)(i)–(ii), 8(b). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. ¶¶ 8(a)(iii), (d). The resolution also banned the travel of the individuals identified 
as participating in the program. Id. ¶ 8(e). 
19. Id. ¶ 12. 
20. S.C. Res. 1874, supra note 1. 
21 . Overview: DPRK 2009 Announced Test, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN 
TREATY ORGANIZATION, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/ 
2009-dprk-announced-nuclear-test/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020); see also Choe Sang-Hun, 
North Korea Claims to Conduct 2nd Nuclear Test, NEW YORK TIMES, May 24, 2009, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/world/asia/25nuke.html. 
22. Id. ¶ 9 (noting that the embargo did not include light arms). 
23. Id. ¶ 26. 
24. Sanctions List Materials, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 1718 SANCTIONS 
COMMITTEE (DPRK), https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/materials (last 
updated Aug. 8, 2018) [hereinafter 1718 SANCTIONS LIST]. 
25. S.C. Res. 2087, supra note 1. 
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December 12, 2012.26 This resolution expanded the individuals and entities 
subject to the asset freeze to include individuals who had assisted in sanc-
tions evasion27 and extended the travel ban to the individuals concerned.28 It 
also clarified the methods of disposal of seized material.29 
Resolution 209430 quickly followed the DPRK’s third nuclear test on 
February 12, 2013.31 This resolution broadened the restrictions on the indi-
viduals and entities falling within the definitions of Resolution 171832 by di-
recting States to prevent the provision of financial services and the transfer 
of assets that could contribute to the DPRK’s nuclear or ballistic missile 
programs.33 Resolution 2094 further expanded the criteria of the individuals 
and entities subject to the asset freeze to individuals or entities acting on 
behalf or at the direction of the designated individuals and entities, as well as 
entities owned and controlled by the designated individuals and entities.34 A 
non-exhaustive list of prohibited luxury goods and a list of additional items, 
materials, equipment, goods, and technology that could contribute to the 
DPRK’s WMD and missile programs were annexed.35 
                                                                                                                      
26. Id. ¶ 1; see also Choe Sang-Hun & David E. Sanger, North Koreans Launch Rocket in 
Defiant Act, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 11, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/12/ 
world/asia/north-korea-launches-rocket-defying-likely-sanctions.html. 
27. Id. ¶ 12. 
28. Id. 
29. Id., Annex 1. 
30. S.C. Res. 2094, supra note 1. 
31. North Korea Announced Nuclear Test, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN TREATY 
ORGANIZATION, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/2013-dprk-
announced-nuclear-test/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020); see also David E. Sanger & Choe Sang-
Hun, North Korea Confirms It Conducted 3rd Nuclear Test, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 11, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/12/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-test.html. 
32. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
33. S.C. Res. 2094, supra note 1, ¶¶ 11. As with Resolution 2087, Resolution 2094 in-
cluded those individuals and entities that assisted in the evasion of sanctions. Id. 
34. Id. ¶¶ 8, 10. Travel bans were also imposed on the individuals. 
35. Id., Annex III, IV. 
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Resolution 2270,36 which followed a fourth nuclear test conducted on 
January 6, 201637 and a ballistic missile test on February 7, 2016,38 drastically 
expanded the economic measures imposed by previous resolutions. One of 
the most significant measures was a ban on the export of coal, iron and iron 
ore (with limited exceptions), gold, titanium ore, vanadium ore, and rare 
earth minerals.39 This resolution also requires States to prevent its nationals 
from selling aviation fuel to the DPRK.40 Further, small arms and light weap-
ons, which had been exempt from earlier bans, were made subject to the 
arms embargo.41 Finally, a catchall provision banned the export of any item 
that a State considered as contributing to the development of the DPRK’s 
WMD programs (e.g., nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, chemical weapons) 
or the operational capabilities of the DPRK’s armed forces.42 
The resolution expanded the financial services measures to include a pro-
hibition on the opening and operation of new overseas branches, subsidiar-
ies, and representative offices of DPRK banks and the opening of new 
branches of foreign States’ banks in the DPRK.43 It further required States 
to close existing financial offices and subsidiaries in the DPRK if the finan-
cial services provided could contribute to prohibited nuclear and ballistic 
missile programs or other activities banned by Security Council resolutions.44 
                                                                                                                      
36. S.C. Res. 2270, supra note 1. 
37. 6 January 2016 North Korea Announced Nuclear Test, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-
TEST-BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-af-
ter-1996/2016-dprk-announced-nuclear-test/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020); see also North Korea 
Nuclear: State Claims First Hydrogen Bomb Test, BBC NEWS (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www. 
bbc.com/news/world-asia-35240012. 
38. Press Release, USPACOM Public Affairs, USPACOM Vigilant During North Ko-
rean Missile Launch (Feb. 6, 2016), https://www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-
View/Article/651573/uspacom-vigilant-during-north-korean-missile-launch/; see also North 
Korea Fires Long-Range Rocket Despite Warnings, BBC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2016), https://www. 
bbc.com/news/world-asia-35515207. 
39. S.C. Res. 2270, supra note 1, ¶¶ 29–30. 
40. Id. ¶ 31. The prohibition does not apply to the fueling of civilian passenger aircraft 
outside the DPRK. See id. (noting that Council “decides also that this provision shall not apply 
with respect to the sale or supply of aviation fuel to civilian passenger aircraft outside the 
DPRK exclusively for consumption during its flight to the DPRK and its return flight”). 
41. Id. ¶ 6. 
42. Id. ¶¶ 8, 27. 
43. Id. ¶¶ 33–34. 
44. Id. ¶ 35. 
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The Security Council adopted Resolution 2321 on November 30, 2016, 
after the DPRK’s fifth nuclear test.45 The Resolution directed the 1718 Com-
mittee to adopt a new conventional arms dual-use list encompassing materi-
als, equipment, goods, and technology.46 It clarified multiple obligations im-
posed by Resolution 2270 and it prohibited the provision of insurance or re-
insurance services to vessels owned, controlled, or operated by the DPRK.47 
Moreover, the resolution introduced procedures to designate vessels that 
were or had been related to prohibited programs or activities, and requires 
the flag State to de-flag such vessels and subject them to the asset freeze.48 
It placed an annual cap on the export of coal by the DPRK and established 
a real-time system on reporting and monitoring the export of coal.49 The 
DPRK’s supply, sale, or transfer of copper, nickel, silver, and zinc were 
newly banned.50 Finally, the resolution strengthened the existing financial 
measures, including the prohibition of public and private financial support 
of trade with the DPRK,51 and required States to expel individuals believed 
to be working on behalf of or at the direction of a DPRK bank or financial 
institution.52 
Following Resolution 2321, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
235653 on June 2, 2017, condemning the DPRK’s nuclear-weapon and bal-
listic-missile-development activities, including a series of launches and other 
related activities conducted since September 9, 2016.54 This resolution newly 
designated fourteen individuals and four entities.55 
The Council then adopted Resolution 237156 on August 5, 2017, con-
demning the launches on July 3 and July 28 of what the DPRK described as 
                                                                                                                      
45. 9 September 2016 North Korea Announced Nuclear Test, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-
TEST-BAN TREATY ORGANIZATION, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-af-
ter-1996/2016-sept-dprk-announced-nuclear-test/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
46. S.C. Res. 2321, supra note 1, ¶ 7. 
47. Id. ¶ 22. For a discussion of the importance of prohibitions on marine insurance as 
a source of economic coercion, see Richard L. Kilpatrick, Jr., Marine Insurance Prohibitions in 
Contemporary Economic Warfare, 95 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 272 (2019). 
48. S.C. Res. 2321, supra note 1, ¶ 12. 
49. Id. ¶ 26(b). 
50. Id. ¶ 28. 
51. Id. ¶ 32. 
52. Id. ¶ 33. 
53. S.C. Res. 2356, supra note 1. 
54. Id. pmbl. 
55. Id. ¶ 3, Annex I, II. 
56. S.C. Res. 2371, supra note 1. 
 
 
 
International Law Studies 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
intercontinental ballistic missiles.57 The resolution imposed a full ban on the 
export of coal, iron, and iron ore,58 added lead and lead ore to the export 
ban,59 and banned the export of seafood.60 It provides new authority to the 
1718 Committee to designate vessels related to prohibited activities and re-
quires States to prohibit the entry of designated vessels into their ports.61 
The resolution restricts the number of DPRK nationals working in other 
States62 and prohibits new or expanded joint ventures and cooperative com-
mercial entities with the DPRK.63 
Resolution 237564 followed the DPRK’s sixth nuclear test on September 
2, 2017.65 It prohibited the DPRK’s import of all condensates and natural 
gas liquids.66 It restricts the annual supply, sale, or transfer of all refined pe-
troleum products to the DPRK to two million barrels and requires the 1718 
Committee and the Committee Secretary to monitor and periodically report 
the amount of refined petroleum products provided to the DPRK.67 The 
resolution limits the annual amount of crude oil supplied, sold, or transferred 
to the DPRK by a State to that amount supplied, sold, or transferred in the 
twelve months preceding the resolution’s adoption.68 It also introduced a 
ban on the export of textile products69 and banned new overseas work au-
thorizations for the DPRK nationals.70 Finally, it required States to prohibit 
                                                                                                                      
57. Id. ¶1; see also David E. Sanger, Choe Sang-Hun & William J. Broad, North Korea 
Tests a Ballistic Missile That Experts Say Could Hit California, NEW YORK TIMES, July 28, 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/28/world/asia/north-korea-ballistic-missile.html. 
58. S.C. Res. 2371, supra note 1, ¶ 8. 
59. Id. ¶ 10. 
60. Id. ¶ 9. 
61. Id. ¶ 6. 
62. Id. ¶ 11. 
63. Id. ¶ 12. 
64. S.C. Res. 2375, supra note 1. 
65. DPRK Sept. 2017 Unusual Seismic Event, COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR-TEST-BAN 
TREATY ORGANIZATION, https://www.ctbto.org/the-treaty/developments-after-1996/ 
2017-sept-dprk/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020); see also David E. Sanger & Choe Sang-Hun, 
North Korean Nuclear Test Draws U.S. Warning of ‘Massive Military Response’, NEW YORK TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/ 2017/09/03/world/asia/north-korea-tremor-
possible-6th-nuclear-test.html. 
66. S.C. Res. 2375, supra note 1, ¶ 13. 
67. Id. ¶ 14. 
68. Id. ¶ 15. 
69. Id. ¶ 16. 
70. Id. ¶ 17. 
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their nationals from engaging in joint ventures or cooperative entities, both 
existing and new, with DPRK entities or individuals.71 
The final resolution in the series, Resolution 2397,72 was adopted on De-
cember 22, 2017, condemning a ballistic missile launch conducted on No-
vember 28.73 This resolution reduced the annual cap on the refined petro-
leum products transferred to the DPRK to 500,000 barrels.74 It also set a cap 
on crude oil transfers of four million barrels or 525,000 tons.75 Sectoral sanc-
tions were expanded through a ban on the DPRK export of food and agri-
cultural products, machinery, electrical equipment, earth and stone (includ-
ing magnesite and magnesia), wood, and vessels.76 The resolution prohibits 
the export of all industrial machinery, transportation vehicles, iron, steel, and 
other metals to the DPRK.77 It strengthened the prohibition on the overseas 
work of DPRK nationals by requiring States to repatriate all such workers 
within the State and all DPRK government attachés monitoring the workers 
within twenty-four months from the date the Council adopted the resolu-
tion.78 It also strengthened the vessel-related measures by obligating States 
to prohibit the provision of insurance or re-insurance services by its nation-
als, and persons and entities subject to its jurisdiction of vessels believed to 
be involved in activities or the transport of items prohibited by Security 
Council resolutions.79 Further, it requires States to de-register vessels in-
volved in prohibited activities.80 
Over thirteen years and through the adoption of ten resolutions, the Se-
curity Council has employed a combination of persuasive and coercive tech-
niques to convince the DPRK to abandon “all nuclear weapons and existing 
nuclear programs” and “any other existing weapons of mass destruction and 
ballistic missile programs.”81 Exercising its authority under Article 41, the 
                                                                                                                      
71. Id. ¶ 18. 
72. S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 1. 
73. Id. ¶ 1; see also Mark Landler, Choe Sang-Hun & Helene Cooper, North Korea Fires a 
Ballistic Missile, in a Further Challenge to Trump, NEW YORK TIMES, Nov. 28, 2017, https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2017/11/28/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test.html. 
74. S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 1, ¶ 5. 
75. Id. ¶ 4. 
76. Id. ¶ 6. 
77. Id. ¶ 7. An exception was made for spare parts needed to maintain the safety of 
commercial civilian passenger aircraft. 
78. Id. ¶ 8. 
79. Id. ¶ 11. 
80. Id. ¶ 12. 
81. Id. ¶ 2. 
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Security Council’s imposition of economic sanctions of increasing severity 
has been a key feature of its efforts to achieve this objective. 
There are now restrictions or prohibitions on the export to the DPRK 
of a wide range of goods. These sweeping resolutions restrict or ban aviation 
fuel, condensates and natural gas, crude oil, luxury goods, refined petroleum 
products, all arms, any item contributing to the military capabilities of its 
armed forces, and WMD-related and dual-use items. Likewise, the resolu-
tions restrict or prohibit imports from the DPRK including, coal, iron, iron 
ore, lead, lead ore, textiles, food and agricultural products, seafood, machin-
ery, earth, stone, wood, vessels, copper, nickel, silver, zinc, gold, titanium 
ore, vanadium ore, rare earth minerals, and all arms. 
The financial and economic restrictions now include an asset freeze that 
covers eighty designated individuals and seventy-five entities, individuals or 
entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and entities owned or 
controlled by them.82 DPRK banks are prohibited from operating branches, 
subsidiaries, and representative offices in other States. Prohibitions on sup-
port for the DPRK’s trade, engaging in joint ventures with designated indi-
viduals and entities, permitting DPRK nationals to work within a State, and 
transferring assets or resources to the DPRK that could contribute to nuclear 
or ballistic missile programs are among the many financial and economic 
restrictions placed on the DPRK. 
Despite the severity of these economic measures and the wide-ranging 
targets of these sanctions, the DPRK has not abandoned its nuclear weapons 
program or its other WMD programs. Indeed, writing for the Council of 
Foreign Relations, Eleanor Albert observed, 
 
World powers have pursued economic sanctions for more than a dozen 
years . . . . While these measures have exacted a heavy toll on the North 
Korean economy, experts say their effectiveness has been undermined by 
the failure of some countries to enforce them and the willingness of some 
companies to flout them. . . .83 
 
Unsurprisingly, Albert concludes that enforcement remains the largest ob-
stacle to effectiveness. 
 
                                                                                                                      
82. See 1718 SANCTIONS LIST, supra note 24. 
83. Eleanor Albert, What to Know About Sanctions on North Korea, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
RELATIONS, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-know-about-sanctions-north-korea 
(last updated July 16, 2019). 
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The biggest challenge is enforcement, which is the responsibility of indi-
vidual states. National authorities often have insufficient resources to in-
spect shipments of ports of entry, carry out complex investigations, and 
perform other enforcement activities. Some individuals and entities, moti-
vated by financial gain, do business with North Korea outside the law, and 
smugglers take advantage of lax inspections . . . . [and] [b]lack market ac-
tivities often go undetected.84 
 
III. RESOLUTION TERMINOLOGY: GOOD PRACTICES AND DEFICIENCIES 
 
The measures, and consequently, the terminology used in U.N. Security 
Council resolutions demonstrate an increased level of complexity and so-
phistication. The expansion of the sanction measures from Resolution 
1718’s relatively straightforward restriction on items contributing to the 
DPRK’s nuclear, missile, and WMD programs to the subsequent restrictions 
and prohibitions placed on a wide variety of imports, exports, and financial 
services required a corresponding increase in the complexity of the language 
used to articulate these restrictions and prohibitions. Negotiations over these 
expanded sanctions measures are highly politicized and compromises create 
ambiguous terminologies or lack clear definitions in the operative para-
graphs. However, to incorporate the provision of the resolutions into do-
mestic law, legal bases, which should be the resolutions themselves, are re-
quired. This definitional clarity has resulted in inconsistencies between the 
Security Council’s objectives in adopting the resolutions and States’ imple-
mentation of them. As such, this Part discusses four examples where lan-
guage challenges the effective implementation of the sanctions. 
 
A. Inconsistency in Reporting Units of Refined Petroleum Products 
 
Resolution 2397 restricts the total supply, sale, or transfer of all refined pe-
troleum products to the DPRK to 500,000 barrels during a twelve-month 
period beginning January 1, 2018 and for twelve-month periods thereafter.85 
To implement this restriction, States are to notify the 1718 Committee of 
the amount of petroleum products supplied, sold, or transferred to the 
DPRK, along with the information of the parties to the transaction, every 
thirty days.86 Based on the notification, the 1718 Committee issues notices 
                                                                                                                      
84. Id. 
85. S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 1, ¶ 5. 
86. Id. 
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when the aggregated amount has reached 75 percent and 90 percent of the 
500,000 barrels.87 When the aggregated amount reaches 95 percent of the 
annual cap, the 1718 Committee Secretariat informs all States that they must 
immediately cease selling, supplying, or transferring refined petroleum to the 
DPRK for the remainder of the year.88 
However, whereas the resolution set the refined petroleum products cap 
by barrels, the unit used in the notifications submitted by States to the 1718 
Committee is tons.89 This inconsistency, combined with the lack of a con-
version rate of tons to barrels, impedes the Secretariat’s obligations to aggre-
gate the amount of petroleum products and undermines the efforts to re-
strict the transfer of refined petroleum products to the DPRK.90 
Refined petroleum products include gasoline, diesel, and kerosene, but 
the publicized State reports do not include information on the type of refined 
petroleum product transferred. This makes the conversion from tons to bar-
rels impossible. Therefore, the State that exports the petroleum product is 
the only party able to report in barrel units. 
One alternative would be for the 1718 Committee to set a uniform con-
version rate from ton to barrel to estimate the barrel-equivalent volume. 
However, items within the category of refined petroleum products have a 
different density. For example, based on the conversion rates published by 
Qatar Petroleum and BP, one ton of gasoline, kerosene, and diesel are ap-
proximately 7.7 barrels, 7.1 barrels, and 6.8 barrels, respectively.91 
To illustrate the problem that this inconsistency creates, from January to 
June 2019, the amount of refined petroleum products that States reported as 
                                                                                                                      
87. Id. 
88. Id. 
89. 2019 Monthly Reports Received from Member States: Supply, Sale or Transfer of All Refined 
Petroleum Products to the DPRK, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 1718 SANCTIONS 
COMMITTEE (DPRK), https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-
or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
90. Panel of Experts, Report dated Feb. 21, 2019, from the Panel of Experts Estab-
lished Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Coun-
cil, transmitted by Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2019/171, 
enclosure, annex 21 (Mar. 5, 2019) [hereinafter 2019 Panel of Experts Final Report]. In its 
report, the Panel of Experts pointed out this problem and recommended the 1718 Com-
mittee agree on a single conversion rate between tons and barrels for all refined petroleum 
rates. Id. 
91. For example, one metric ton of gasoline is 8.5 barrels, whereas one metric ton of 
kerosene is 7.8 barrels and one metric ton of diesel is 7.5 barrels. See QATAR PETROLEUM, 
CONVERSION FACTORS, https://qp.com.qa/en/Pages/ConversionFactor.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2020). 
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transferred to the DPRK was 29,044.15 tons.92 If only diesel was transferred, 
the total volume is about 197,500 barrels, however, if only gasoline was 
transferred, the total volume is about 223,639 barrels. The latter estimated 
volume represents nearly half of the 500,000-barrel limit only six months 
into the year, thus requiring close monitoring for the remainder of the year. 
Because of the lack of information on the volume in barrels, the 1718 
Committee is unable to monitor the volume of petroleum products trans-
ferred to the DPRK with the rigor that the task requires.93 Therefore, States 
should report transfers in barrels to allow the 1718 Committee to monitor 
the aggregate volume more accurately. Alternatively, the Committee could 
designate a conversion rate for estimating the amount, although, as noted 
above, given the different conversion rates this would only provide a rough 
estimate of the amount of refined petroleum product transferred. 
 
B. Repatriation of DPRK Overseas Workers and Reporting 
 
A similar issue arises for reporting the repatriation of DPRK nationals earn-
ing income aboard. Resolution 2397 requires States to repatriate DPRK na-
tionals earning income within their territory, as well as DPRK government 
safety oversight attachés monitoring DPRK workers abroad, and to report 
these repatriations to the 1718 Committee.94 However, some States have dis-
puted the meaning of this obligation. Shortly after the repatriation deadline, 
a letter co-signed by twenty-eight States, which stated that based on para-
graph eight of the resolution, DPRK nationals earning income overseas 
should be repatriated regardless of their occupation, employer, and type of 
visa, was circulated at the General Assembly.95 But, the Russian Federation 
issued a commentary stating that the letter misread this operative para-
graph.96 
                                                                                                                      
92. Supply, Sale or Transfer of All Refined Petroleum Products to the DPRK, UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL 1718 SANCTIONS COMMITTEE (DPRK), https://www.un.org/ securi-
tycouncil/sanctions/1718/supply-sale-or-transfer-of-all-refined-petroleum (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2020). 
93. This is illustrated in the 1718 Committee website, which lists the amounts of petro-
leum products transferred to the DPRK each month in tons, but lists the amount in barrels 
as “pending.” Id. 
94. S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 1, ¶ 8. 
95. Letter Dated 2 January 2020 from the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of Germany to the 
United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/74/639 (Jan. 6, 2020). 
96. Комментарий Департамента информации и печати МИД России 
относительно направленного в Генеральную Aссамблею ООН письма группы 
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The Security Council governs the interpretation of Security Council res-
olutions. However, where there is a dispute on the interpretation among 
Members of Security Council, it is unlikely that the Security Council can issue 
an official interpretation for Member States to follow. The absence of unified 
official interpretation makes Member States’ implementation difficult, as 
competent authorities generally need a legal basis to incorporate the elements 
of the resolution into domestic law. In this situation, DPRK individuals and 
entities could use States with narrower interpretations of the restrictions as 
a haven. Furthermore, the resolution does not clarify what to report (for 
example, the number of repatriated DPRK nationals or the date of repatria-
tion) in the implementation reports with one exception of requiring an ex-
planation if less than half of such DPRK nationals were repatriated within 
twelve months of the resolution’s adoption. 
As a result of these deficiencies, the States’ reports vary, and several re-
ports contain no specific information, such as the number of the DPRK 
nationals within the country or the number repatriated.97 Furthermore, two 
States’ reports are not published on the 1718 Sanctions Committee website,98 
which could create the risk that other countries will follow this approach, 
thereby damaging the transparency of the Committee’s work. Left un-
addressed, this practice may discourage other States’ implementation of the 
resolutions. As such, the 1718 Committee should provide better guidance 
on the required reporting details for their repatriation reports. 
 
C. Adoption of HS Code and System Limitations 
 
As these Security Council resolutions restrict such a wide range of items, one 
of the challenges States face is the incorporation of the restricted items into 
                                                                                                                      
государств по вопросу северокорейских трудовых мигрантов [Russian Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, Information and Press Department, Commentary Regarding a Letter from a 
Group of States to the U.N. General Assembly on the Issue of the Overseas Workers 
from the DPRK], MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION (Jan. 
30, 2020), https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/ cKNon-
kJE02Bw/content/id/4014034. 
97. Panel of Experts, Report dated Aug. 30, 2019, from the Panel of Experts Estab-
lished Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Coun-
cil, trans-mitted by Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2019/691 
(Aug. 30, 2019) ¶85 [hereinafter 2019 Panel of Experts Midterm Report]. 
98. See Implementation Reports, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 1718 SANCTIONS 
COMMITTEE (DPRK), https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/ implementa-
tion-reports (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
 
 
 
Smart Language and Sanctions Implementation Vol. 96 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
their custom control system. To address this problem, Resolution 2397 at-
tempted to clarify the restricted items by incorporating the first two digits of 
the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) codes.99 
The HS coding system is an international product nomenclature devel-
oped by the World Customs Organization (WCO) to classify goods on a 
common basis.100 In this system, each commodity group is identified by a 
six-digit HS code.101 As of July 2019, it was used as the basis for customs 
tariffs and the compilation of international trade statistics by 211 countries 
and customs and economic unions.102 Over 98 percent of the commodities 
traded internationally are classified by an HS code. While incorporating the 
HS code to identify products and clarify the restricted goods was a step for-
ward, further improvement is necessary. 
Before the adoption of Resolution 2397, resolutions imposing re-
strictions of goods did not provide corresponding HS codes and States 
showed considerable variance in their designations of what they believed to 
be banned items. This discrepancy mainly resulted from States arriving at 
different interpretations of the resolution language. For example, for the rare 
earth minerals banned by Resolution 2270,103 the WCO recommended in-
cluding minerals: uranium or thorium ores and concentrates (HS Codes 
261210 and 261220); other ores and concentrates (HS Code 261790); alkali 
metals, rare-earth metals, mercury (HS Code 2805); and radioactive chemical 
                                                                                                                      
99. S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 1, ¶ 6. 
100. The coding system contains approximately 5,300 product descriptions. See Harmo-
nized Commodity Description and Coding Systems (HS), UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL 
TRADE STATISTICS KNOWLEDGEBASE, https://unstats.un.org/unsd/tradekb/Knowledge 
base/50018/Harmonized-Commodity-Description-and-Coding-Systems-HS (last visited 
Mar. 23, 2020). 
101. The first two digits identify the chapter in which the goods are classified, the next 
two digits identify groupings within that chapter, and the final two digits provide greater 
specificity as to the goods. As an example, 090210 would be broken down as follows: 09 
(coffee, tea, mate, and spices); 02 (tea, whether or not fermented); and 10 (green tea not 
fermented). Id. Individual countries can then make the six-digit code even more specific by 
adding additional digits. 
102. List of 212 Countries, Territories or Customs or Economic Unions Applying the Harmonized 
System (159 Contracting Parties), WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION (Feb. 21, 2020), 
http://www.wcoomd.org/-/media/wco/public/global/pdf/topics/nomenclature/overvi 
ew/hs-contracting-parties/list-of-countries/countries_applying_hs.pdf. 
103. S.C. Res. 2270, supra note 1, ¶ 30. 
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elements & isotopes, etc. (HS Code 2844).104 The Panel of Experts reported, 
however, that the European Union defined rare earth minerals as ores of the 
rare earth metals (HS Code 25309000) and monazites, and other ores used 
solely or principally for the extraction of uranium or thorium (HS Code 
2612).105  China defined them only as other rare earth metals (HS Code 
2530902000). 106  Russia defined them as mixtures or alloys (HS Code 
2805301000); radioactive chemical elements and radioactive isotopes and 
their compounds, etc. (HS Code 2844); compounds, inorganic or organic, of 
rare earth metals, of yttrium, or of scandium, or of mixtures of these metals 
(HS Code 2846); ferrocerium and other pyrophoric alloys in all forms; and 
articles of combustible materials (HS Code 3606).107 The Security Council 
attempted to address discrepancies such as these by employing HS codes in 
Resolution 2397. 
While this decision was helpful, it did not adequately communicate to 
States which items fell within the resolution’s ban on DPRK exports. For 
example, the resolution bans “food and agricultural products,” defined as 
items found in HS code chapters 07, 08, and 12.108 These chapters encom-
pass “vegetables and certain roots and tubers, edible,” “fruits and nuts, edi-
ble; peel of citrus fruit or melons,” and “oil seeds and oleaginous fruits; mis-
cellaneous grains, grains, seeds and fruit industrial or medical plants; straw 
and fodder.”109 However, these are only three of the twenty three HS code 
chapters for items possibly defined as food and agricultural products, except 
for seafood, which Resolution 2371 prohibits.110 Not included are such ex-
port items as “products of the milling industry” (HS code 11) and “animal 
or vegetable fats and oils and their cleavage products” (HS code 15).111 
                                                                                                                      
104. Panel of Experts, Report dated Feb. 17, 2017, from the Panel of Experts Estab-
lished Pursuant to Resolution 1874 (2009) addressed to the President of the Security Coun-
cil, transmitted by Note by the President of the Security Council, at 317, U.N. Doc. 
S/2017/150 (Feb. 27, 2017) [hereinafter 2017 Panel of Experts Final Report]; see also id. 
Annex 16-1. 
105. Id. at 84; see also id. Table 15. 
106. Id. at 84. 
107. Id. 
108. S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 1, ¶ 6. 
109. HS Nomenclature 2017 Edition, WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION, http://www. 
wcoomd.org/en/topics/nomenclature/instrument-and-tools/hs-nomenclature-2017-edi-
tion.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
110. Items fall under HS Codes 01 to 24. 
111. S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 1, ¶ 6 (noting the sectoral ban on seafood); see also HS 
Nomenclature 2017 Edition, supra note 109. 
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In 2017, products classified with HS codes 07, 08, and 12 were the 
DPRK’s top three export products among the items covered by HS Codes 
06 through 15.112 However, in 2016 and 2015, products classified with afore-
mentioned HS codes 11 and 15 were the DPRK’s third and fourth-largest 
agricultural export products, exceeding HS code 07 product exports.113 Thus, 
the exports of agricultural products unrestricted by the resolution are still a 
significant source of income to the DPRK. 
Furthermore, it is highly likely that the DPRK will undermine the sanc-
tions by strategically increasing the export of agricultural products that do 
not fall under HS codes 07, 08, and 12. Indeed, in its report published in 
2017, the Panel of Experts noted a DPRK university study that concluded 
with a recommendation to evade the mineral bans by decreasing exports of 
raw materials and increasing exports of processed products.114 In fact, ac-
cording to UN Comtrade, export of by the DPRK to China of the items of 
HS codes 11 and 14 has increased from 2017 to 2018 (which are not re-
stricted by the resolution), whereas those of HS codes 07, 08, and 11 has 
decreased. 115 Although the trend cannot be confirmed until the 2019 data 
becomes available, the HS codes could create a loophole to acquire revenue 
by exporting agricultural products that do not fall under the designated HS 
codes. Furthermore, the mismatch of the title in the resolution created by 
the detailed designation for the specific HS code could cause confusion 
when incorporating this prohibition into a Member States’ trade controls. 
Another example of the limitation of the designation of restricted items 
by HS codes is that certain products prohibited by Resolution 2397 can be 
categorized as products not listed in the resolutions. For example, beverages 
in aluminum cans were still being exported to the DPRK in 2018,116 at a time 
                                                                                                                      
112. North Korea, OBSERVATORY OF ECONOMIC COMPLEXITY (OEC), https://oec. 
world/en/profile/country/prk/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
113. Id. 
114. See 2017 Panel of Experts Final Report, supra note 104, at 85, ¶ 260. 
115. According to UN Comtrade, the export of HS code 11 items from the DPRK to 
China increased from $657,300 in 2017 to $1,067,848 in 2018, while HS code 14 items in-
creased from $188,331 in 2017 to $254,895 in 2018. In contrast, HS code 07 items and HS 
code 08 items sharply decreased between 2017 and 2018, from $12,974,664 to $4,754,371 
and from $79,045,575 to $4,313,828, respectively. The DPRK’s export of HS code 12 items 
to China also decreased from $13,050,469 in 2017 to $1,090,766 in 2018. The DPRK’s ex-
port value of HS code 15 items from 2017 to 2018 is not available. See UN COMTRADE 
DATABASE, https://comtrade.un.org/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2020). 
116. Chad O’Carroll, No Can Do: How Tinned Coffee Exposes the Myth of Targeted North 
Korea Sanctions, NKNEWS (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.nknews.org/2019/08/no-can-do-
how-tinned-coffee-exposes-the-myth-of-targeted-north-korea-sanctions/. 
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when the export of aluminum (HS code 76) to the DPRK was prohibited. 
The Security Council’s intent to ban the export of metals is clear: “[A] Mem-
ber States shall prohibit the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to the 
DPRK, through their territories or by their nationals [of] . . . iron, steel, and 
other metals (HS codes 72 through 83) . . . .”117 Products made of metals are 
restricted under those HS codes. However, when used as a part of the final 
product or a container that is in a different, permitted code, metals can pass 
through export controls. In the case of the beverages in aluminum cans, they 
fall within HS code 22, which is not restricted. Although it is not confirmed 
that the DPRK uses this loophole strategically to acquire prohibited metal, 
as noted in the university study discussed above,118 the DPRK is actively 
seeking to evade sanctions. This strategic evasion demonstrates the chal-
lenges of regulating an export control system based on HS codes. 
To avoid this shortcoming, the resolution should be written such that 
States can recognize the intent of the restriction and apply the relevant HS 
codes in its screening system. For example, if a State noticed an item that is 
purchased using large metal tanks or containers, then even if the final prod-
uct usually falls under an unrestricted HS code category, the State should 
take action to avoid the risk of exporting restricted items. 
 
D. Definitional Issues 
 
Resolution 2375 prohibits the opening, maintenance, and operation of joint 
ventures and cooperative entities with DPRK individuals or entities, and ob-
ligates States to close those ventures and entities that already exist.119 How-
ever, the resolution fails to define what constitutes a joint venture or coop-
erative entity. On the one hand, a specific definition could create loopholes 
that would permit modification of the organizational structure or ownership 
of the entity to fall outside the prohibition. On the other hand, a lack of 
definition of joint ventures and cooperative entities allows States to make 
their own definitions, which also risks abuse, including creating a haven for 
businesses operated by the DPRK citizens living abroad. For example, the 
Russian Federation informed the Panel of Experts of a Russian company, 
whose sole founder was a DPRK citizen, which was registered as a Russian 
                                                                                                                      
117. S.C. Res. 2397, supra note 1, ¶ 7. 
118. See 2017 Panel of Experts Final Report, supra note 104, at 85, ¶ 260. 
119. S.C. Res. 2375, supra note 1, ¶ 18. 
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limited liability company not subject to the prohibition on joint ventures and 
cooperative entities.120 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
This article discussed the development of the U.N. economic sanctions re-
gime designed to address the DPRK’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. 
It focused on how the language used in these U.N. Security Council resolu-
tions affect implementation. To address the DPRK’s repeated nuclear 
weapon and ballistic missile tests, the Security Council expanded sanction 
measures drastically, and as a result, State obligations increased significantly. 
At the same time, due to the political sensitivity of this issue and disagree-
ments among the members of the Security Council, the resolution’s language 
sometimes lacks clarity or leaves room for ambiguity. Thus, States’ obliga-
tions are not always clearly specified, which in turn creates problems for the 
competent authorities that need specific legal grounds to establish domestic 
law to implement U.N. resolution obligations. Furthermore, the ambiguity 
of the language permits interpretations inconsistent with the Security Coun-
cil’s intent. Both deficiencies result in what is essentially the partial imple-
mentation of the sanctions. 
Since these ambiguities and lack of adequately detailed obligations are 
mostly the result of compromises among the Security Council members, it 
is very difficult for the 1718 Committee to provide more comprehensive 
guidance on the prohibitions and restrictions of a resolution when requested 
by States. In the absence of 1718 Committee clarification, the States them-
selves must interpret the language, and, as has been shown, this has resulted 
in varied interpretations. Further, the uncertainty of its obligations discour-
ages States from providing substantial information in the reports it submits. 
Definitional inconsistency is also seen in designations based on the HS 
codes. HS codes, which are supposed to be a tool for clarification, can limit 
the items the Security Council seeks to restrict when the listing of HS codes 
is not comprehensive. 
Most importantly, the DPRK is still actively seeking ways to evade the 
sanctions and enhanced implementation by States is vital to addressing these 
attempts.121 And, as this article has illustrated, in some instances the language 
                                                                                                                      
120. 2019 Panel of Experts Final Report, supra note 90, at 61, ¶ 150. 
121. See id. at 375–78, Annex 89: Recommendations; see also 2019 Panel of Experts 
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employed by the Security Council has hindered effective enforcement. To 
remedy these shortcomings, the Security Council should take practical steps, 
such as establishing a useable unit of measure for refined petroleum prod-
ucts, employing use of HS codes to specify sanctioned products, improving 
definitions of prohibited activities, and requiring more detailed State reports 
on the implementation of sanctions. 
As of this writing, DPRK nuclear and missile programs are intact, and 
the DPRK continues to defy Security Council resolutions directing it to 
abandon these programs. The effective implementation of sanctions by 
Member States is the key to their success. The DPRK sanctions regime is 
well established and widely recognized by U.N. Member States and to facil-
itate a more effective implementation of these sanctions, the Security Coun-
cil must provide clearer expectations and use smarter language so Member 
States have less uncertainty as to their obligations under these resolutions. 
Absent that change, there is little reason to believe that the U.N. resolutions 
will accomplish their objective to convince the DPRK to discontinue these 
prohibited programs and, therefore, the country will remain a threat to in-
ternational peace and security. 
 
                                                                                                                      
ommendations and the 2019 Midterm Report provides thirteen recommendations to ad-
dress implementation challenges and shortcomings. Carrying out these and other Panel rec-
ommendations are essential to improving the effectiveness of the sanctions. 
